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Developments Before the War
Italian policies toward Croatian territories during the Second World War 
represent a continuation of those pursued by the Fascists after they came to 
power in 1922. From its very beginnings, the Fascio (Partito nazionale fascis-
ta) had been an extremist nationalist party. When various Irredentist groups 
(Pro Fiume, Pro Dalmazia, Italia irredenta) linked up with the Fascists, irre-
dentism became a key plank in the Fascists’ foreign policy goal to achieve a 
“national and imperial Italy.” This meant expansion into the Balkans and the 
eastern Adriatic Coast and transforming D’Annunzio’s mare amerissimo into 
an Italian mare domestico. Through this means, the political and economic 
power of the Fascist empire would be attained.
These policies received an initial boost from the Allied nations through 
the secret Treaty of London in 1915 which promised Italy the Croatian ter-
ritories of Istria, the Kvarner, the Dalmatian islands (other than Šolta and 
Brač) and the mainland areas of northern Dalmatia in return for entering 
World War I on their side. Italy took over these areas in 1918, even though 
these same territories had formed part of the new State of Slovenes, Croats 
and Serbs formed upon Austria-Hungary’s collapse.1 The entry of the State of 
Slovenes, Croats and Serbs into the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes 
(Kraljevina Srba, Hrvata i Slovenaca (SHS), called the Kingdom of Yugoslavia 
after 1929) on 1 December 1918 with the Kingdom of Serbia forced Italy 
to reach an agreement with the SHS concerning the so-called “Adriatic 
Question.” The Italians and Yugoslavs resolved their differences through the 
Treaty of Rapallo in 1924 (signed by representatives of the governments of 
Benito Mussolini and Nikola Pašić) pursuant to which Italy also received 
Rijeka. As a result, Italy obtained 10,000 square kilometers of Croatian and 
Slovenian ethnic territory with over 500,000 Croats and Slovenes whose 
national rights received no guarantees under any agreement. The Greater 
* Zdravko Dizdar, Ph. D., Croatian Institute of History, Zagreb, Republic of Croatia.
1 The State of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs, with its capital in Zagreb, included those areas 
of Austria-Hungary populated primarily by these three peoples and existed for a little over a 
month until its union with Serbia and Montenegro on 1 December 1918.
180
Z. DIZDAR, Italian Policies toward Croatians  
Serbian rulers remained satisfied with having fewer Croats and Slovenes 
in Yugoslavia in order to more easily overcome their resistance to Serbian 
hegemony. At the same time, the agreement allowed supporters of Greater 
Serbia to overcome their differences with neighboring Italy at the expense 
of these same Croats and Slovenes.
From the first, systematic terror and forcible Italianization character-
ized Italian policies in those Croatian areas which found themselves with-
in the Italian Kingdom. It commenced with the dissolution of all Croatian 
and Slovenian institutions, societies and schools and continued through the 
emigration (which took on the elements of an exodus) of numerous Croats 
as a result of persecution. Italians from Italy moved into their homes in 
order to change these areas into ethnically Italian ones. All of this caused the 
rise of resistance among Istrian Croats. In 1921, armed revolts of miners in 
Labin and Croat peasants in the Proština area broke out. This represented 
the first antifascist resistance in Europe. Even though the Italians suppressed 
these uprisings, the resistance of Istrian Croats did not end and took on new 
forms and methods.
Irredentist desires dominated Italian policies toward Croatian areas with-
in the Yugoslav state in the interwar period. The Irredentists sought the 
destruction of Yugoslavia (seeing it as an artificial creation of Versailles), the 
annexation of Dalmatia and the creation of a Croatian state under Italian 
protection. Satisfying this goal remained tied to the evolving situation in the 
Balkans and Europe. Soon after Italy’s annexation of Rijeka, Mussolini began 
to agitate in favor of Italy’s annexation of Dalmatia, to cooperate with sep-
aratist movements in the SHS Kingdom and to work to isolate Yugoslavia 
diplomatically (especially by building ties with Bulgaria and Hungary). After 
the proclamation of King Alexander Karadjordjević’s dictatorship (1929) 
and the founding of the “Ustasha - Croatian Revolutionary Organization,” 
led by Dr. Ante Pavelić (which had the goal of forming a sovereign and inde-
pendent Croatian state outside of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia), Mussolini 
welcomed the Ustasha and allowed them to establish military camps in 
Italy. In 1932, the Ustasha, with direct Italian support, organized the “Velebit 
Uprising” in Lika. Italy hoped that the Uprising would destabilize Yugoslavia 
and lead to its collapse and the formation of a Croatian state under Italy’s 
hegemony. This did not come to pass, and Italy had to wait for the right 
opportunity.
In the meantime, the fascist states began to mutually cooperate. In 1936 
Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy reached an accord, later joined by Imperialist 
Japan, to form the Rome-Berlin-Tokyo Axis.2 Italy received assurances from 
Germany and Japan that the Mediterranean, including the Croatian Adriatic 
and the Balkans, would be an exclusive zone of Italian influence. Despite this, 
Fascist Italy had to take into account the interests and goals of the German 
Third Reich. This became evident in 1937 when, in keeping with German 
2 For more concerning Italian policies in this period, see Enes Milak, Italija i Jugoslavija 
1931-1937 (Belgrade: Institut za savremenu istoriju, 1987.).
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desires, Yugoslavia and Italy entered into an agreement in Belgrade plac-
ing their political and trade relations on a new footing. The agreement con-
firmed their mutual respect for each other’s territorial integrity. The Italian 
side pledged to stop supporting the Ustasha, provide the Yugoslavs with 
information concerning the Ustasha émigrés and allowed all Ustasha who 
wished to do so to return home.
Mussolini held the remaining Ustasha group led by Ante Pavelić in reserve 
for possible future use. Simultaneously, the Italian Fascist leadership entered 
into unsuccessful discussions with representatives of the Croatian Peasant 
Party (Hrvatska seljačka stranka - HSS) to resolve the so-called “Croatian 
Question” to Italy’s benefit. These talks intensified during 1939.
Dr. Vladko Maček, the HSS President, refused to come to terms with 
Italian Foreign Minister Galeazzo Ciano and instead reached an agreement 
with Belgrade. Because of the critical international situation in Europe and 
the looming war, Belgrade could no longer put off resolving the “Croatian 
Question” if it wished to save Yugoslavia from disintegration. 26 August 
1936 saw the establishment of the Banovina of Croatia within the Kingdom 
of Yugoslavia, only days prior to the beginning of the Second World War.3 
The Croatian Banovina obtained a Ban (Vice-Roy), its own administra-
tion and Parliament (Sabor), as well as legislative, administrative and judi-
cial autonomy which could not be modified or rescinded without its con-
sent. Its territory covered 65,456 square kilometers and had a population 
of 4,024,601 (according to the 1931 census), of which 70.1% consisted of 
Croats, 19.1% Serbs and 10.8% others. It took up the area of the present-day 
Croatian Republic (other than Dvor on the Una and Baranja as well as areas 
then under Italy). It also included thirteen counties (kotari) in present day 
Bosnia and Herzegovina and Šid County in present-day Vojvodina in Serbia 
which had a majority of Croat population. It did not include eastern Srijem 
and the Boka kotarska.
All of the Serbian political parties (other than the Independent Democratic 
Party), Serbian nationalist and Greater Serbian organizations and societies, 
the Army and the Serbian Orthodox Church opposed the establishment of 
the Croatian Banovina. They considered it dangerous for Serbdom and the 
survival of the state. As a result, they formed the Greater Serbian move-
ment “Srbi na okup” (“Serbs Together”) with the goal to establish an admin-
istrative entity under the name “Serbian Lands” or Greater Serbia from the 
remaining six provinces to the south of the Croatian Banovina as well as 
those parts of the Croatian Banovina where Serbs constituted a majority 
and which the Serbs considered necessary for geo-strategic or political rea-
sons. The goal of establishing a Greater Serbia at the cost of Croatia’s his-
torical territory has remained a constant theme among Greater Serbian and 
Chetnik political expansionist circles until our present day. Italy knew how 
to make use of this in its favor during the War.
3 Ljubo Boban, “Vanjskopolitička aktivnost vodstva HSS-a 1935-1941,” Kontroverze iz pov-
ijesti Jugoslavije, volume 3 (Zagreb: Školska knjiga, 1990.), pp. 13-265.
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The Ustasha also opposed the Croatian Banovina whose autonomy 
they believed had no guarantees, supported the internal consolidation and 
strengthening of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, and prevented the establish-
ment of a free and independent Croatian state. The Ustasha’s positions coin-
cided with Italian Fascist policies.
In 1939 Italy occupied Albania. Italy forced Albania’s Parliament to agree 
to Italy’s annexation of Albania and to accept the Italian king as Albania’s 
own. In a secret memorandum to Hitler, Mussolini emphasized the strategic 
advantage held by the Axis powers in Europe in the pending war as a result 
of having obtained possession of the Czech lands and Albania. He believed 
it necessary to immediately take the entire Danubian basin and the Balkans 
at the beginning of the war and to economically use these areas for the con-
tinued successful running of the war. He emphasized Italy’s need to post-
pone fighting until 1942 when Mussolini believed Italy would be ready to 
continue the war. Hitler, however, ignored Mussolini’s proposal.
In 1940 Italy again turned to Pavelić and attempted to use him to quick-
en the tempo of events and realize its goals in Croatian territories. However, 
Hitler had other ideas. Hitler desired peace in the Balkans while war oper-
ations continued in other areas. This resulted in Yugoslavia’s agreement to 
join the Tripartite Pact in Vienna on 25 March 1941. Previously, Mussolini 
had refrained from launching his planned military operations in 1940 
against Yugoslavia and he decided to attack Greece instead. However, as a 
result of suffering defeats in Greece, he had to beg Hitler for assistance and 
Hitler agreed to provide it. The military coup of 27 March 1941 in Belgrade 
changed Hitler’s judgment concerning the situation in the Balkans. Hitler 
determined to attack the Kingdom of Yugoslavia beginning on 6 April 
1941.4
The Relationship of Croatia and the Fascist Kingdom of Italy 
During the War
As a result of the war (from 6 to 17 April 1941), occupation and divi-
sion of the territory of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, a new stage began in 
the satisfaction of the expansionist goals and interests of the Third Reich 
and Fascist Italy over Croatian areas and the Balkans. The proclamation 
of the Independent State of Croatia (Nezavisna država Hrvatska - NDH) 
took place in this context on 10 April 1941.5 The NDH consisted of the 
Banovina of Croatia, the remainder of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and east-
4 Dnevnik grofa Ciana (Zagreb: 1948), and Tajni arhivi grofa Ciana 1936-1942 (introduced 
and edited by Dr. Bogdan Krizman) (Zagreb: 1952); Bogdan Krizman, “Odnosi Jugoslavije s 
Njemačkom i Italijom 1937-1941,” Historijski zbornik XVII (Zagreb: 1964.). These works set 
forth the general activities and designs of Italian Fascist policies toward Croatian territories 
in the years noted in their titles.
5 For more information, see: Ferdo Čulinović, Okupatorska podjela Jugoslavije (Belgrade: 
Vojnoizdavački zavod, 1970); Bogdan Krizman, Pavelić i Ustaše (Zagreb: Globus, 1978); 
Bogdan Krizman, NDH između Hitlera i Musolinija, (Zagreb: Globus, 1983); Fikreta Jelić-
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ern Srijem and had a total area of 102,725 square kilometers. It had a popu-
lation of 6,640,000 people, of which 30% consisted of Serbs, while Muslims 
made up around 11% (the leadership of the NDH proclaimed the Muslims 
to be Croats, and many Muslim leaders agreed to that designation). The 
Italians made use of this large non-Croat population in their relations vis-à-
vis the NDH. They further exploited a number of damaging internal policies 
adopted by the NDH’s leaders. The Italian Fascists received the opportunity 
to achieve their maximum program on the Croatian Adriatic coast. Already 
during preparations for the April war, we find Italian territorial pretensions 
toward this area set forth in their propaganda materials. They believed these 
areas to be “their” (Italian) historical, hereditary and inalienable territory. 
The new occupation of the entire Dalmatian coast, all of its islands and its 
interior to its “natural borders” on the Velebit and Dinaric Mountains would 
allow Italy to establish its “strategic borders” and thus, according to their 
thoughts, forever solve the Adriatic Question. Italian business circles, as 
seen in an analysis earmarked for Mussolini by Dr. Dino Gardini, support-
ed these claims. They proposed the division of the Italian zone of influence 
and economic domination into two parts or zones.6 The first zone would be 
contiguous with an area known as the “Zone of Absolute Italian Interests.” 
This zone would include the bauxite and other mines in the coastal region 
allowing Italy to become an exporter of the ores extracted from there. Italy’s 
claim to these territories would be based on Italy’s hereditary rights as suc-
cessor to the Venetian Republic. The second zone would border the first 
zone and extend to Germany. Italy planned to flood the NDH economy with 
Italian products to eliminate all other competitive influences. This would 
allow Italy to be supplied with raw materials from the NDH’s mines and 
other sources and thus realize Italy’s political and economic influence in the 
country. During the War, Italian leaders never swerved from these goals.
Even during the April war one can see that the Italians found a contend-
er in this area in the Third Reich. This became apparent during talks in 
Vienna on 21 and 22 April 1941 between Ciano and Ribbentrop concerning 
the delimitation between Germany and Italy. After these discussions, on 24 
Butić, Ustaše i Nezavisna Država Hrvatska 1941-1945, (Zagreb: Sveučilišna naklada Liber i 
Školska knjiga, 1978); Rafael Brčić, “Prilog razmatranju okupacionih sistema u BiH 1941 god-
ine, Prilozi 5 (Sarajevo: 1969), pp. 217-259; Jere Jareb, Pola stoljeća hrvatske politike (Buenos 
Aires: Knjižnica Hrvatske revije 1960; second edition: Zagreb: Hrvatski institut za povijest 
/hereinafter HIP/, 1995); Jere Jareb, “Hrvatski narod u drugom svjetskom ratu 1941-1945,” 
Časopis za suvremenu povijest (hereinafter, ČSP), 27 (Zagreb: 1995), Nr. 3; Hrvoje Matković, 
Povijest Nezavisne Države Hrvatske (Zagreb: Naklada Pavičić, 1994.); Jure Krišto, Sukob sim-
bola. Politika, vjere i ideologije u Nezavisnoj Državi Hrvatskoj (Zagreb: Globus, 2001); and 
Talijanska uprava na hrvatskom prostoru i egzodus Hrvata (1918.-1993.), Zbornik radova s 
međunarodnog znanstvenog skupa (Zagreb: HIP and Društvo “Egzodus istarskih Hrvata,” 
2001.). We can best assess Italy’s policies toward Croatian areas during the Second World War 
by examining the views of the leadership of the Kingdom of Italy to the NDH.
6 Arhiv oružanih snaga Srbije i Crne Gore, Beograd (Archives of Armed Forces of the 
Serbia and Montenegro, Belgrade, hereinafter, AOS SCG), Talijanska arhiva, box 387, fasc. 8, 
doc. no. 4-1.
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April Hitler demarcated the areas between German and Italian occupation-
al forces along the Samobor-Glina-Dvor-Jajce-Fojinica-Višegrad line. The 
German occupational zone took up the territory north of the line, while the 
Italian occupational zone took the area to the south. The Germans refused 
Italian demands to include all of Dalmatia and its wider hinterland with-
in Italy, advising the Italians to engage in direct negotiations with the NDH. 
The Germans received Italian assurances that they would have access to the 
bauxite mines for German industry should they come under Italian rule.
Talks with the NDH in Ljubljana (25 April) and in Tržič (7 May) conclud-
ed with the execution of a number of agreements in Rome on 18 May 1941 
signed by Mussolini and Pavelić. The first agreement established the border 
between the NDH and Italy. Pursuant to it, Italy annexed the most devel-
oped portion of the Croatian coastline, including Sušak, Šibenik and Split, 
as well as the Boka kotarska. As a result, another 5,381 square kilometers of 
Croatian territory came within Italy. Around 380,000 people lived in this 
territory, consisting of 280,000 Croats, 90,000 Serbs, 5,000 Italians and 5,000 
others. This area became known as the First Zone.
The economic loss that this represented to Croatia can be seen in the fol-
lowing facts. 124 corporate entities with 150 factories (52 in Split and its 
area, 27 in Šibenik and 22 in Sušak) with around 9,000 employees had been 
based in the First Zone. The NDH lost 15 large olive oil processing plants, 
and retained 12; it lost 10 large fish processing plants, and retained 8 small-
er ones; it lost the only large factory for processing bauxite (i.e., the alumi-
num factory at Lozovac near Šibenik with over 3,500 employees); it lost 9 
shipyards, and retained one (in Kraljevica); it lost one paper factory in Sušak 
(which manufactured fine types of paper as well as cigarette paper) and 
retained one in Zagreb. It also lost the major factories in the cement indus-
try. The NDH retained only the ports of Metković and Gruž, as well as the 
sub-Velebit portion of the Croatian Littoral and the coastline from Omiš to 
Dubrovnik.7 Italy thus became master of the Adriatic.
At the same time, a second agreement committed the NDH not to build 
any military installations in an area stretching approximately 80 kilome-
ters from the annexed areas and the coast, nor to maintain a navy, other 
than smaller forces for police and financial reasons.8 This 80-kilometer belt 
became known as the Second Zone. Italy sought to play a dominant role in 
this Zone and to later include it within its political system. The remaining 
area of the NDH from the Second Zone to the demarcation line with the 
German zone of influence became known as the Third Zone.
A third agreement concerned political relations between the NDH and 
Italy. It provided for Italy’s guarantee of the political independence of the 
7 Hrvatski državni arhiv (Croatian State Archives, Zagreb, hereinafter, HDA), Fond NDH 
– “S,” box 520, doc. inv. no. 1,283. Veleobrt na novo prisjedinjenim primorskim krajevima 
Hrvatske.
8 Both agreements contain cartographic annexes.
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Croatian Kingdom, with the stipulation that Italy would not enter into any 
international commitments which would be contrary to such a guarantee. 
As noted, these agreements styled the NDH as a “Kingdom” and the Italian 
Duke of Spoleto from the Savoy Dynasty had been tapped to be its king.
Pavelić received strong assurances that Italian forces would withdraw 
from the NDH’s territory, which in fact they never did. The Italians would 
rely on these very military forces to attempt to modify the new border to 
their advantage. They would further encourage Serbian politicians to initi-
ate a campaign calling for additional annexations by Italy.
Although Mussolini’s 20 May 1941 order transformed Italian forces from 
an occupational to a garrisoned force on NDH territory, they continued 
to act like occupiers. By July 1941, Italy had 65,000 troops stationed in the 
annexed areas and 78,300 troops on NDH territory.9 Because each of the 
three Italian Zones had varying legal positions and other specific character-
istics, the Italians organized their rule in each differently, but with the over-
riding desire to tie them together into one central administrative Italian dis-
trict. In the First Zone, one found direct Italian sovereignty. In the Second 
Zone, also known as the “Adriatic Coastal Belt,” Italian military forces held 
power. In the Third Zone Italian military forces had operative power, with 
all remaining power being held by the NDH.
After the outbreak of revolts in NDH territory in July and August 1941, 
the Italians used the inability of NDH military forces to choke the upris-
ing to carry out the reoccupation of the Second Zone at the beginning of 
September and of the Third Zone in October 1941, in each case using signif-
icant military force.10 The Italians forced the NDH to withdraw all Ustasha 
forces and dissolve all Ustasha organizations in the Second Zone while 
remaining Croatian regular army (Domobran) and other military forces 
came under Italian command. The Italians also took over civilian adminis-
tration in the Second Zone. The NDH government had the right to be con-
sulted with respect to certain matters related to its territory occupied by 
Italian troops. For this purpose they attached to the command of the Second 
9 Zdravko Dizdar, “Brojitbeni pokazatelji odnosa vojničkih postrojbi na teritoriju Nezavisne 
Države Hrvatske 1941-1945,” ČSP 28 (1996), Nr. 1-2: 161-197.
10 According to intelligence report of the Command of the Ground Forces of the NDH 
dated 11 July 1941, “relations with the Italian Army are not really in the best of shape because 
the Italians are interfering with our military and civilian authorities in frontier areas.” It men-
tions Goražde and Čajniča where the Italians took over control and further states that they 
moved 60 to 70 million dinars from the annexed areas of Slovenia to the NDH which their 
military forces use for payroll purposes. It continues by noting that in garrisoned areas of the 
NDH the “Italians are assisting the rebels in order to increase discontent among the popula-
ce there and to have influence during the drawing of the final frontiers.” It also notes that “in 
Split and Kotor all refugees are under their protection – Jews from our state.” AOS SRJ, Arhiva 
NDH, box 85, doc. no. 12/6-2 to 11. Of interest is the statement of General Blaizia, the depu-
ty commander of the Second Italian Army, given to liaison officer Reš on 20 August 1941 in 
Karlovac: “Because you Croats had been unable to provide order, our Duce found it neces-
sary to take necessary measures to put order and peace in place.” HDA, Arhiva MUP-a RH, 
no. III-14/563.
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Italian Army a general administrative representative, Dr. Andrija Karčić, 
who would later be replaced by Dr. David Sinčić. For military matters, the 
NDH accredited General Mihail Lukić to play a similar role.
Italian Policies toward Annexed Croatian Areas 1941-194311
After the entry into the agreements in Rome, the Italian government 
organized its administration in annexed Croatian territories in keeping with 
the structure then found in Italy though with certain specific differences. 
On 7 June 1941 a decree of the King expanded the administrative-territo-
rial Province of Rijeka-Kupa. The Province took up, along with Rijeka, the 
counties of Kastav and Čabar as well as a part of Delnice County, together 
with Sušak, Bakar (with Bakarac) and the Kvarner Islands (including Cres 
and Lošinj which Italy had obtained in 1920 through the Treaty of Rapallo). 
Temistocle Testa remained its Prefect.
Mussolini’s 20 May 1941 decree united the remaining annexed territory 
with the Province of Zadar into the Governate of Dalmatia with its capital at 
Zadar. The Governate consisted of three Provinces: Zadar, Split and Kotor. A 
prefecture existed in each Province as well as general civilian administrative 
organs and the Questurae as the police force. Military matters fell under the 
province of Italian military commanders.
Mussolini named Dr. Guiseppe Bastianini as the Governor of Dalmatia. 
Bastianini remained at this post until February 1943 when Francesco Giunta 
replaced him. Dr. Paolo Zarbino became the Prefect of Split Province, Verzio 
Orazi became Prefect of the Zadar Province, and Franco Seasselati became 
Prefect of the Kotor Province. They remained subordinate to the adminis-
tration in Zadar headed by the Governor.
The goal of annexation consisted not only in simply joining Croatian 
territories to Italy but also to Italianize the native Croat and Serb popula-
tion as soon as possible. A number of regulations and decrees signed by the 
Governor as well as the Prefects, especially in the second half of 1941, sup-
ported this goal.
The Italian administration initially showed flexibility (until autumn 1941) 
by granting certain concessions to the inhabitants as a sign of conciliation, 
but these concessions hid the true goals of Italian rulers. Concessions rep-
resented a means to more effectively achieve the Fascists’ denationaliza-
11 Concerning Italian policies in the annexed territories, there are a number of works on 
which I rely and I note the following: Dragovan Šepić, “Talijanska okupaciona politka u 
Dalmaciji (1941-1943),” Putevi revolucije (Zagreb: 1963), Nr. 1-2: 215-241; Vojimir Kljaković, 
“Talijanska politika odnarodnjavanja u Dalmaciji 1941-1943 godine,” Zbornik 4 (Split: Institut 
za historiju radničkog pokreta Dalmacije, /hereinafter IHRPD/, 1978), pp. 529-538; Neva 
Žurić-Scotti, “Talijanska okupacija Biokovsko-neretvanskog i otočkog područja 1941-1943,” 
Biokovo u NOB-u i socijalističkoj revoluciji 1941-1945. (Split: IHRPD, 1983), pp. 270-282; 
Vjekoslav Vrančić, Urota protiv Hrvatske (Zagreb: Nakladna knjižara Velebit, 1943.); Hrvoje 
Mezulić, Fašizam krstitelj i palikuća (Zagreb: Nakladni zavod Hrvatske, 1946); and Eugen 
Dido Kvaternik, Sjećanja i zapažanja 1925-1945. (Zagreb, “Starčević”, 1995).
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tion plan. The Italians refrained from military mobilization in the annexed 
territories, commenced certain public works, granted certain privileges to 
domestic merchants, craftsmen and businessmen, established a provision-
ing system similar to that found in Italy, and introduced a number of sim-
ilar benefits. Widespread propaganda and ever-greater promises accompa-
nied these concessions.
However, actual practices quickly uncovered the true goals of the Italian 
Fascists. The Italians had immediately undertaken to give all annexed 
Croatian territories an exterior Italian facade. First, Italian flags replaced all 
Croatian flags in all public and other areas. Next, the Italians removed the 
more visible Croatian monuments and memorials. In Split they removed 
the statue of medieval Croatian Bishop Grgur Ninski and a memorial tablet 
for Croatian politician Ante Trumbić. In Trogir they removed the emblems 
of Croatian Ban Mladen Šubić from his gravestone as well as the memori-
al plaques for the 100th anniversary of the Croatian national anthem Lijepa 
naša in the town hall and that placed on the home of Croatian Ban Peter 
Berislavić. In Korčula, they took down a memorial plaque to medieval 
Croatian King Tomislav. They also removed numerous other Croatian cul-
tural monuments in many other cities and towns.
Italian occupational zones in Croatia from 1941 to 1943. Zone 
I was annexed by Italy in May 1941
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The Government of Dalmatia (Governo della Dalmazia) provided only an 
illusion that the annexed territories supposedly enjoyed some sort of special 
status. This can best be seen by the Royal Decree of 18 May 1941 concerning 
the administration of these areas. The Decree made them an integral part 
of Italy with the Dalmatian Governor directly subordinate to Mussolini. He 
had the responsibility to carry out the orders of the central Italian govern-
ment, achieve a unified administrative policy and gradually bring Dalmatia 
within the parameters of the Italian constitution. He carried out his duties 
through the orders of and in consultation with Mussolini.
In his speech in Rome on 10 June 1941, Mussolini emphasized that Italy 
could consider the “Dalmatian question to be finally solved.” He declared 
the Croat and Serb population there to be “foreigners” and “enemies” as a 
result of whom they would have to move from that area, and he announced 
a population exchange and a policy of emigration. The next day, he ordered 
that Italians descended from Dalmatia in the Rijeka Province be sent to 
the Dalmatian Provinces so that they could “strengthen the Italianity [of 
Dalmatia] to the maximum extent possible.”
Numerous forms of pressure toward native Croat and Serb inhabitants 
followed, along with agile propaganda and violence so as to remove every-
thing that would stand in the way of “re-Italianization.” Italian became the 
official administrative language while in some places the Fascist Black Shirts 
also prohibited the use of Croatian in public areas. In order to assist in this 
task, only the Italian press could be circulated. A dual language newspaper 
had been established in Split (San Marco), replaced in December 1941 by the 
dailies Il Popolo di Spalato in Split and Giornale di Dalmazia in Zadar. These 
newspapers became important pillars in the promotion of Italianism and 
Fascism.
The Italianization of place names followed in the annexed territories. All 
names of areas, places, settlements, streets, squares and signposts on roads 
received new Italian names. Personal names and surnames in new identi-
ty cards used Italian etymology while the systematic transformation of 
Croatian personal and surnames into Italian ones began to take place.
Bastianini’s decree of 19 July 1941 dissolved all associations, institutions 
and parties not organized within the Fascist Party. Those dissolved included 
numerous Croatian educational and sports societies and national reading 
rooms which refused to continue their work as Italian organizations.
The Italians paid special attention to existing Croatian schools on the 
annexed territories. They required the schools to be Italianized within a two-
year period and the schools became the focus of the Italianization of the 
youth. The termination of native teachers began immediately while numer-
ous teachers brought to the area took over the running of the curriculum in 
all elementary and high schools. A special Office for Schools in the Annexed 
Areas had been established in Rome within the Ministry of Education in 
order to carry out this work. At the end of 1941 it issued special instruc-
tions for the introduction of Italian in Dalmatia and those areas annexed in 
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the Rijeka-Kupa Province. The government provided scholarships to select-
ed native students to attend higher schools and colleges in Italy. However 
the expected results in education did not materialize. The educational pol-
icies caused general disgust and gave rise to resistance among students and 
their parents, as well the remaining teachers. Fascist assimilationist activities 
toward Croatian clerics and the education of their charges similarly failed as 
the Italians attempted to make use of religion and the Church in an effort to 
promote their goals.
Subsequently, the Italians turned to state officials in the administration 
and public works with the goal to terminate the employment of as many 
locals as possible and to replace them with cadres from Italy. The Italians 
used various means to achieve this, such as a requiring complete fluency in 
Italian (checked through a special test), oaths for faithfulness, and entry into 
Fascist organizations. According to a 10 March 1942 report from Bastianini 
to the government, by that time half the officials had been removed and the 
process continued until Italy’s capitulation. At the same time, the Italians 
introduced a procedure to oversee the activities of business organizations 
and other private matters.
In order to alleviate the extremely poor (in Italian eyes) ethnic situation 
in the annexed territories, the Italian occupational administration sought 
to settle as many Italians there as possible. Based on a proposal made to 
Mussolini by the well-known Istrian Fascist Italo Sauro, a special Office for 
the Adriatic Territories, headquartered in Rome, worked on coordinating the 
work of state institutions to remove obstacles to carrying out this task.12 It 
had as its main goal the “elimination of Slavdom in the Adriatic territories.” 
Concurrently, many foreign Italians came to this area who received assur-
ances that they would obtain jobs, homes and land. They included native 
Italians who had chosen to go to Italy following the First World War. Many 
of them received privileges and became the most insolent standard-bearers 
of Italianization in the annexed territories. In addition to establishing Fascist 
Party branches (fascio di combattimento), the Italians formed various Fascist 
organizations (such as GIL - a student organization, Dopolavoro - a Fascist 
workers’ organization, etc.). Citizenship laws also served to change the eth-
nic composition by giving the Prefects the right to refuse citizenship to all 
Croats and Serbs there as being “worthless individuals.”
Various regulations and policies further placed all economic activities at 
the disposal of Italian authorities to be used to achieve the Italianization of 
these areas.
In addition to systematic Italianization, Italy’s Fascist rulers also encour-
aged and supported Dalmatian autonomism and sparked old animosities 
12 Saopštenja br. 34-53 o zločinima okupatora i njihovih pomagača /hereinafter Saopštenja/. 
(Beograd: Državna komisija za utvrdjivanje zločina okupatora i njihovih pomagača Jugoslavije 
/hereinafter Državna komisija/, 1945), pp. 564-576.
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between Croat and Serb inhabitants by portraying themselves as defenders 
of the Serb population.
They openly persecuted all opponents of their occupational rule. All of this 
caused extreme distress among the Croat inhabitants which soon thereafter grew 
into armed resistance and a long war under the leadership of the Communists. 
Their resistance expanded to all Croatian areas along the coast and the interior. 
The area of the First and Second Italian Zones would thus become the largest 
center of antifascist struggle in the NDH and former Yugoslavia.
Terror, Crimes and Concentration Camps in Areas 
Annexed by Italy
Repressive means became the major method used by Italian occupation-
al authorities to break the resistance of the people and force their integra-
tion into Italy. Numerous Fascist squadristi roamed the annexed territories. 
Together with regular armed forces in this area they undertook every possi-
ble means to end all resistance but without success.13 Immediately after the 
occupation, the Military Court for the Second Army established its head-
quarters in Sušak. Mussolini’s 22 July 1941 decree opened a section of that 
Court in Šibenik with jurisdiction over all occupied and annexed Croatian 
areas outside of the Rijeka Province. Pursuant to a 13 August 1941 order of 
Bastianini, the Šibenik Court received all the powers of the former Yugoslav 
Court for the Defense of the State. The authorities also decreed numerous 
crimes to be punishable by death.
During August 1941 the Italians handed down the first death sentences 
for sabotage. But these actions did not suffice after the outbreak of armed 
resistance in the annexed territories.
Mussolini reacted by a 3 October 1941 order which decreed the death 
penalty for anyone who “on the territories annexed to the Kingdom of Italy . 
. . commits an act with the intent to limit the unity, independence and integ-
rity of the State” or “propagates or leads an armed rebellion against State 
authorities.” On 11 October Bastianini established the Extraordinary Court 
for Dalmatia (Tribunale Straordinario della Dalmazia) for use against politi-
cal criminals, members of Partisan forces, Communist Party members and all 
others who opposed the status quo. Within a month, this Court condemned 
35 people to death and dozens more to long prison sentences. Mussolini’s 
decree of 24 October 1941 established a Special Court for Dalmatia (Tribunale 
Speciale della Dalmazia) which took over the Extraordinary Court’s func-
tions and had wide jurisdiction.14 The Court worked quickly, informally and 
13 The main Italian documents concerning repressive measures in the annexed areas of 
Dalmatia which are spoken of later in this article have been published in Narodnooslobodilačka 
borba u Dalmaciji 1941-1945 /hereinafter, NOB u Dalmaciji/, Zbornik dokumenata, vol. 1 
(1941) through vol. 8 (September-October 1943) (Split: IHRPD, 1981-1985). 
14 Saopštenja, br. 34-53, op. cit., pp. 577-585. This source contains numerous examples of 
the judgments of these Italian courts, including those involving mass executions of hostages
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arbitrarily. Its judges consisted of officers of the regular army and the Fascist 
militia, who in their sole discretion determined the existence of punishable 
acts and passed judgment. This Court adopted the principal of collective 
responsibility so that individuals received punishment for acts committed 
by others with which they had no connection.
The proceedings conducted by this Court became known as “Roman 
Justice” (guistizia romana). The Court pronounced thousands of judgments, 
several hundred of which involved the death sentence, while almost all the 
rest received various terms of prison and forced labor.
According to statistics of the Yugoslav State Commission of Crimes of 
the Occupier and Their Assistants, a total of 5,000 people became subject to 
proceedings in these Italian courts and the courts condemned 500 of them 
to death. The remainder ended up being interned in various camps in Italy 
where some of them lost their lives while many more were taken from there 
after Italy’s capitulation into German camps where many died.
A report of the NDH Consulate in Rijeka sent to the NDH’s Foreign 
Affairs Ministry on 20 December 1941 wrote that 800 people, including 60 
women and 40 children, passed through Rijeka from Dalmatia in chains in 
four transports from 15 November to 20 November 1941 on their way to 
camps in Italy’s interior. The report further commented: “It is distressing to 
see our people with folded, cuffed hands, tied together with chains, going 
into the unknown, laboring while carrying their luggage, their faces dis-
torted with pain caused by their shackles.” The report further claimed that 
“the Italians do not intend to stop with their arrest and deportation of large 
numbers of people,” since on 24 November the Split Carabinieri Command 
received from Milan 3,000 shackles. The Consulate reported that “recently 
forces of the Fascist Militia have been especially prominent in carrying out 
persecution against our people in annexed territories. They surround villag-
es, search through homes, take food, clothes, valuables [and] cattle, they fire 
from their guns on barrels filled with wine and kill innocent people without 
any reason or prior proceedings...”15
Starting in June 1941, the Italians organized their first assembly point or 
Camp on the small islet of Osljak near Zadar. Prisoners there along with those 
interned in Zadar and Šibenik were transported to camps throughout Italy. 
Groups of internees remained in the Camp’s so-call lazzaret, housing an army 
garrison and the Camp administration, until Italy’s capitulation. From the 
summer of 1942 the Italians transferred prisoners from this Camp in groups 
to surrounding concentration camps, especially the one on Molat Island.
Because the new steps taken to Italianize the annexed territories did not 
bring results to the Italians’ liking, the authorities adopted other means 
 (such as one requiring the execution of three hostages for every telegraph pole destroyed), 
as can also be found in Saopštenja, br. 1, from which the citied facts are taken. See also Jure 
Krišto, Sukob simbola, pp. 346-359.
15 Ibid.
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of persecution. A report from December 1941 by the Prefect of Split, Dr. 
P. Zerbino, announced the new measures. Noting that all the activities of 
Italian rulers had only led to “the antipathy of this people toward Italy, 
and especially toward Fascism,” he suggested that they had to put a stop to 
this “in the first place with force,” and later “while holding the borders, to 
remove the people, to remove them completely.”16 Thus in the first months 
of 1942, in addition to sending people to camps, a new and massive expul-
sion of inhabitants from “the Dalmatian territory” to the NDH took place. 
According to Prefect Zerbino’s report to the Dalmatian Government of 15 
May 1942, from 1 November 1941 to the writing of the report, 1,796 persons 
from the Split Province alone had been interned in Italy, while 1,273 people 
had been forced across the border into the NDH. According to NDH statis-
tics, the total number of Croats from that area recorded as being exiled and 
who reached the NDH and registered with authorities reached 17,000.17
At the same time, in order to give the Second Army a certain “nation-
al badge” and to take away its symbolism as an occupational army, its name 
changed on 9 May 1942 into the “Supreme Command of Military Forces 
of Slovenia and Dalmatia.” At this time the first doubts of ultimate success 
in the battle against the Partisans and the liquidation of armed rebellion 
began to appear among Italian military and civilian authorities. As a result, 
the Italians sought to uproot Partisan forces and their supporters in the 
annexed territories. They planned to establish a cordon sanitaire surround-
ing the Italian border in the NDH using powerful military units (includ-
ing Chetnik forces) to prevent the Partisans from crossing into annexed 
areas. They believed this to be a precondition to “maintaining Italians in 
Dalmatia.”18 From mid-1942, the Italian Army under took a series of larg-
er operations throughout Dalmatia in order to destroy the Partisans and to 
create a protective belt across the frontier. The Italians attempted to estab-
lish special “Anti-Communist Volunteer” units (the so-called “non-Chetnik 
groups”) among the inhabitants of the annexed territories under the direct 
command of an Italian officer, but they achieved no noticeable success in 
this endeavor.
Simultaneously, Italian civil authorities increased their overall pres-
sure on the people of the annexed areas, especially through enacting mea-
sures against the so-called ribela - the insurgents and their families. Based 
on Bastianini’s 7 June 1942 order, the Italians created special lists of per-
sons from annexed areas in Dalmatia who had left their place of habita-
tion and their townships “in order to join the rebels.”19 The Italians con-
16 Ibid.
17 Vjekoslav Vrančić, Urota protiv Hrvatske (Zagreb: Nakladna knjižara Velebit, 1943.). Some 
of these exiles immediately joined the Partisans and thus had not been included in the num-
bers registered by NDH authorities.
18 Ibid.
19 Saopštenja, br. 34-53, op. cit., pp. 473-481. This work contains both the text and a facsi-
mile of the order.
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sidered these families to be hostages and prohibited them from leaving 
their place of residence under threat of execution. In places where sabo-
tage, diversions and military attacks had occurred, the provision of neces-
sities and victuals for the local populace ended. All those “who give assis-
tance and help or who in any other manner support the actions of the reb-
els” would be executed.20 Executions immediately followed and the Italians 
arrested numerous people (often all the inhabitants in a number of villag-
es) on the basis of these decrees. An enactment provided that five hostag-
es would be executed for every civilian who had been a victim of an assas-
sination, while twenty would be executed for every Italy officer or official 
of the civilian administration in Dalmatia killed. In order to have the neces-
sary number of hostages, the authorities made numerous arrests. According 
to a report of Carabinieri Colonel Butia, from July to September 1942 in the 
annexed territory of Dalmatia the Carabinieri alone arrested 2,073 people, 
composed of 436 men, 943 women and 694 children.21
In order to be able to have all of these new internees under control in 
one place, a 27 June 1942 order of Bastianini, consented to by the Italian 
Ministry of Interior Affairs, established the Molat Concentration Camp on 
the same-named island near Zadar in Jaz Cove.22 Several rows of barbed 
wire encircled the Camp over a one kilometer radius. At first, the intern-
ees stayed in small tents. Later authorities raised eight to nine wooden bar-
racks holding 150 people each, in which the inmates slept on earthen floors. 
The camp could at most hold 1,200 internees. But, the number of inmates 
always remained significantly higher. Engineer Leonardo Fonatba became 
the administrator of the Camp. His assistant, Karlo Szomer, replaced him 
on 7 January 1943. One hundred fifty Carabinieri and five hundred Italian 
soldiers guarded the Camp day and night. The Camp’s prisoners includ-
ed whole families and often the inhabitants of entire villages. Through the 
end of 1942, 2,067 persons had been interned in the Molat Camp from the 
areas of Šibenik, Skradin and Biograd alone. On 29 June 1942 the Camp held 
223 internees (76 men, 103 women and 44 children); on 20 July the Camp 
already numbered 1,320 inmates (359 men, 566 women and 395 children); 
on 15 August the number reached 2,337 (866 men, 1,021 women and 450 
children (of whom 250 boys and 200 girls));23 by 11 January 1943 the num-
20 Ibid.
21Zbornik dokumenata i podataka o narodnooslobodilačkom ratu jugoslavenskih naroda (here-
inafter, Zbornik NOR-a), tom 5, vol. 9, Borbe u Hrvatskoj 1942. god. (Beograd: Vojnoistorijski 
institut Jugoslovenske narodne armije, 1955), pp. 477-480.
22 Saopštenja, br. 34-53, op. cit., pp. 551-563. For more concerning this and other Italian 
camps, see Narcisa Lengel-Krizman, “Koncentracioni logori talijanskog okupatora u Dalmaciji 
i Hrvatskom primorju (1941-1943),” Povijesni prilozi 2 (Zagreb, 1983.), pp. 247-283. This has 
been the most comprehensive work on this topic and most of the following short descripti-
ons are almost entirely taken from this work.
23 NOB u Dalmaciji, vol. 3 (Split: IHRPD, 1982.), op. cit., pp. 410-412, and vol. 4 (Split: 
IHRPD, 1983.), op. cit., p. 510, and pp. 600-602. One can also find in this source the text and 
a copy of Mussolini’s “Rules Concerning Punishments for Internees in Concentration Camps 
Established in the Annexed Territories” dated 19 November 1942.
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ber rose by 2,985 new inmates. The Italians transferred many of the pris-
oners to other camps in Italy so that thereafter 1,627 (552 of them women) 
remained in Molat. But, new inmates continued to arrive. Thus, on 14 June 
1943 a group of 250 arrived from Lozovac. Even after Mussolini’s fall and 
the creation of the Badoglio government (25 July 1943), a new group of 
about 40 inmates arrived in the Camp.
The order of Zadar Prefect General Gaspero Barbieria of 19 May 1943 
declared all men from 21 to 50 years of age interned in the camp related to 
persons who had fled to the Partisans to be hostages to be used in retaliation 
for acts of sabotage and killings undertaken by Partisans in his Province. 
The Prefect personally made all execution decisions. Retaliation against the 
hostages in the Molat camp followed. On 22 May Barbieri ordered the exe-
cution of 66 inmates in retaliation for the destruction of telegraph poles 
near Šibenik, i.e., three inmates for each destroyed pole. General Robottia’s 
intervention succeeded in lowering the number to 40 hostages.
The Italians executed the hostages outside the camp, usually in Zadar, at 
police stations or places on the mainland, sometimes in places where the 
acts which gave rise to the cause of the executions occurred. Every arrival of 
the police boat to get hostages caused panic among the inmates.
More than 10,000 people passed through the Molat Concentration Camp. 
It became known as a “camp of death” and a “grave of the living.” Because of 
overcrowding, horrendous hygienic and food conditions, sickness and ter-
rible treatment, 422 inmates died from 30 June to 25 November 1942, while 
532 inmates died during the first half of 1943. The number of deaths during 
other periods of the Camp’s existence remains unknown. Women and chil-
dren made up most of the dead.24
The Italians shut down the Molat Concentration Camp in September 1943 
after Italy’s capitulation. A “shock group” composed of the Camp’s inmates, 
organized and led by Communists and Partisan sympathizers, disarmed the 
Italian garrison. Partisan boats successfully took a portion of the inmates to 
the mainland, part of which immediately joined the Partisans, mostly in the 
newly formed “Molat Fleet of Armed Ships.”
Because of overcrowding in the Molat Camp, from autumn 1942 and the 
beginning of 1943 arrestees had been temporarily placed in improvised col-
lection points. One such area existed for several months and became known 
as the Concentration Camp Hagar-Vodica. Documents show that 1,800 peo-
ple passed through the Camp. The Italians transported some to the Molat 
Camp, with most going to camps in Italy. Similar camps at the same time 
existed for short periods on the island of Murter, near Šibenik, through 
which around 1,200 inmates passed, and on the island of Olib, north of 
Molat, through which approximately 1,500 prisoners passed. The Italians 
transported smaller numbers of internees from these camps to Molat, while 
most went directly to various camps in Italy.
24 N. Lengel-Krizman, “Koncentracioni logori talijanskog okupatora”, pp. 255.
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Along with the Molat Camp, the Italians moved to establish one addition-
al larger transit camp in the area in order to partially solve the problem of 
ever larger numbers of prisoners and of their housing. This matter especial-
ly came to the fore in connection with the orders of General Umberto Spigo, 
commander of the XVIII Italian Corps, which called for the removal of the 
entire male population over the age of 15 from a number of settlements 
along the coast where Italian forces had been placed in connection with ras-
trellamente (cleansing) operations in the Dalmatian Zagora, the Šibenik lit-
toral and neighboring islands. These operations began on 21 March 1943 
when the Eugenio di Savoia Division starting from Šibenik and the Bergamo 
Division starting from Trogir, headed toward Drniš, later joined by the First 
Rapid Cavalry Division in Šibenik.
As a result, on 25 March 1943 the Italians established the Zlarin Concen-
tration Camp (Campo di Concentramento Rasrellati di Zlarino). The Camp 
had been placed on the rocky, barren and waterless Martin Peninsula, in an 
area measuring 80 meters by 80 meters, surrounded by a barbed wire fence. 
Within it, a smaller fenced area isolated hostages. The Italians placed 18 to 
20 inmates in military barracks. Lieutenant Cino di Rosa, commander of the 
173rd Section of the Eugenio di Savoia Carabinieri Division, administered the 
Camp. Lieutenant Umberto Ransay from the Bergamo Division succeeded 
him. One hundred twenty Italian soldiers and about 20 Carabinieri secured 
the Camp. By 30 April 1943, the Camp housed 1,645 inmates, while another 
104 had already been shipped to camps in Italy, 149 sent home and 5 sent to 
the hospital in Šibenik. As new groups arrived in the Camp, the Italians sent 
others to camps in Italy and to the Camp on Rab, while permitting only a 
smaller number of exhausted and sick inmates to go home. Along with dif-
ficult housing conditions, the Camp’s hygienic situation remained very poor 
and the inmates continuously suffered from hunger and thirst. The Camp 
guards harassed and beat practically all the inmates, especially the hostag-
es. The Italians executed seven of the Camp’s prisoners. Dysentery appeared 
in the Camp beginning in May 1943, as did other diseases, from which 9 
inmates died in the Camp and a further 17 in Šibenik’s hospital. The Italians 
dissolved the Camp on 15 June 1943 and transported its 1,200 prisoners by 
ship to Rijeka and from there to camps in Italy. After Italy’s capitulation, 
the Germans took a portion of Zlarin’s former inmates to their own work 
camps, from which only a dozen returned alive.
In March 1943 the Italians also established a Concentration Camp on 
Ugljan, an island near Zadar, for purposes “of interning politically suspi-
cious elements from Dalmatia.”25 Though Ugljan had been planned as one of 
the larger of the Italian camps, Italy’s fall in September 1943 ended further 
construction of the half-completed Camp.
Italian civilian and military authorities also opened camps and impris-
oned and deported the population in parts of southern Croatia and the 
25 NOB u Dalmaciji, vol. 5. (Split: IHRPD, 1982.), op. cit., p. 588.
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Boka kotorska which had been annexed by Italy. On 30 March 1942 in the 
Province of Kotor, the Headquarters of the VI Italian Army Corp ordered 
the establishment of the Camps of Prevlaka and Mamula. The first came 
under the control of the Messina Division and the second under the Emilia 
Division. The Italians placed the Prevlaka Camp in military barracks and 
its inmates consisted mostly of Partisan sympathizers and hostages, i.e., 
families and relatives of Partisans. The Camp initially contained two parts. 
The first part housed inmates from the Boka area and the second housed 
inmates from the NDH. The Italian Camp administrators applied a much 
more strict regime to the latter, banning inmates from receiving packag-
es from their homes. As a result, over 200 died of hunger. Several thousand 
internees passed through the Camp who the Italians transported to other 
camps after having held them there for a time.26
How the Italians acted outside the Camps can be clearly seen by the exam-
ple of Primošten, though hundreds of similar examples on the annexed ter-
ritories can be cited. The Partisans had attacked a column of Italian sail-
ors near the town on 13 November 1942. Fourteen sailors died in the bat-
tle. In keeping with the instructions of General M. Roatta and Governor 
G. Bastianini, the Italian Army took repressive actions against the civilian 
population of Primošten three days later. The Italians surrounded the town 
and opened heavy artillery fire on it from land and sea. The Italians also 
bombed the town from the air with three planes. The bombing destroyed or 
heavily damaged numerous houses, while injuring many of the townspeo-
ple who attempted to find secure shelter. Afterwards, the infantry turned on 
the undefended town. There they separated the men, put them in line and 
shot them or slaughtered them with bayonets. The infantry lined up the 
women and children and terrified them by pointing machine guns and rifles 
at them and threatening to execute them. A second group of soldiers went 
from house to house, sacking them and thereafter putting them to the torch. 
They left some hand held bombs behind after leaving the village which later 
killed a number of children. This action resulted in the deaths of 80 peo-
ple, the arrest and deportation to the Concentration Camp in Vodice of 166 
people and the destruction of or damage to 300 homes, as reported by the 
Commissar of the Šibenik County in his 25 November 1942 report to the 
Prefect of Zadar.27
The very next day, 17 November 1942, the Bishop of Šibenik, Dr. Fra 
Jeronim Mileta, sent a protest to Governor Bastianini against this cruel act 
against peaceful and unarmed people. He forwarded a copy of his protest to 
Rome and to the State Secretary of the Holy See, Cardinal Luigi Maglione 
in order that he could advise the Pope. He did this again as a result of 
26 The Camps at Mamula (which had approximately 1,000 inmates) and at Bar, as well as 
the transport of inmates from those areas to camps in Albania and Italy, is further discussed 
in Ankica Pečarić – Josip Pečarić, “Položaj Hrvata u Boki kotorskoj za vrijeme talijanske 
okupacije 1941.-1943.,” Talijanska uprava na hrvatskom prostoru, pp. 373.-396.
27 Saopštenja, br. 34-53, op. cit., pp. 460-465.
197
 Review of Croatian History 1/2005, no.1., 179-210
other incidents, intervening on behalf of hostages. Zagreb Archbishop Dr. 
Aloysius Stepinac also protested the conduct of Italian military units to R. 
Casertana, the Italian Minister in Zagreb, as a result of this and many sim-
ilar occurrences. Stepinac advised Cardinal Maglione and the Pope of his 
protests and American radio carried reports concerning Stepinac’s actions.28 
NDH authorities also protested, but without any effect. The planned com-
plete removal of native inhabitants from Croatian annexed territories and 
their replacement with immigrant Italians from Italy continued to be car-
ried through.
It must be noted that Italian authorities in the area of the First Zone 
undertook measures to confine Jews and thereafter to place them in camps.29 
Until the beginning of the war on 6 April 1941 around 450 Jews lived in the 
annexed areas of Dalmatia, 415 of them in Split. Because the Italian regime 
treated Jews significantly better than the regimes in the NDH and other sur-
rounding areas of former Yugoslavia, Jews from there fled to the First Zone. 
Over 3,000 Jewish refugees, mostly from the NDH, arrived in Split. The Jews 
of Split provided them with food and lodging, allowing some of them to 
emigrate further to Italy or the United States. Other than smaller groups of 
Jews in Čapljina and Makarska, where they had been temporarily housed, 
and a group of about 200 in Kotor, all the remaining Jews had been placed 
in the area of Split. There, through the efforts of Split’s Jewish religious com-
munity, Italian authorities granted them the right to temporary residency, 
significant monetary assistance and ration cards for food supplies.
But even here Jews suffered from certain anti-Jewish acts and regula-
tions. For example, the (probably staged) destruction of a plaque on 12 June 
1941, which commemorated the entry of the Italian Army into Split, had 
been blamed on Jews. As a result the Synagogue, Jewish shops and dozens of 
apartments were demolished.
Italian authorities permitted around 1,100 Jewish refugees from Split 
to enter into so-called “liberal confinement” in Italy. At the same time, the 
Italians confined 496 Jewish refugees in Korčula and Vela Luka on Korčula 
Island and 252 on Mljet Island. There they lived in private lodgings, had 
unrestricted movement, and paid a residency tax. After Italy’s capitulation, 
28 HDA, Fond Hrvatsko križarsko bratstvo, box 1, Biskupski ordinarijat Šibenik, no. 2769, 
17 XI 1942, J. Bastiniani to Dr. J. Mileta. This memorandum is further discussed by Jure 
Krišto, “Postupci Talijana prema Hrvatima od 1941 do 1943 prema crkvenim vrelima,” in: 
Talijanska uprava na Hrvatskom prostoru, pp. 623-635.; Actes et documentes du Saint Siege rela-
tive a la seconde guerre, vol. 9; La Saint Seige et les victims da la guerre, janvier 1943-decembre 
1943. (Vatican: 1975), doc. no. 73 (p. 164), 189 (pp. 297-298), and 193 (p. 305). These sources 
contain a number of reports concerning actions taken by Italian authorities toward interned 
Croat, Serb and Jewish civilians from Croatian territories. Such actions included prison sen-
tences and executions. These sources further include requests made to the Holy See for inter-
vention in these matters with the Italian government which the Vatican undertook to fulfill.
29 See more concerning this in Jaša Romano, Jevreji Jugoslavije 1941-1945. žrtve genocida i 
učesnici NOR-a, (Belgrade: Jewish historical museum, 1980), Teritorije pod italijanskom oku-
pacijom – aneksijom, pp. 134-151.
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a portion of the Jews from Split and Korčula joined the Partisans, a portion 
succeeded in escaping to Italy, and the Germans arrested the remainder and 
shipped them to their concentration camps where they practically all per-
ished.
Turning back to Italian relations with Croatian inhabitants, a similar situ-
ation existed in the area of the Rijeka Province as in Dalmatia. There, Italian 
authorities had introduced a series of measures against the civilian popu-
lation beginning in May 1941. Along with looting and changing the names 
of counties, places and cities, the Italians quickly introduced a number of 
repressive measures against local Croats so as to turn the population in this 
annexed area into an Italian one. The Italians introduced individual and lat-
ter mass repressions, employing the most diverse means and methods. The 
Italians expelled all who had moved into the area. Arrests and imprisonment 
of anti-fascists and Communists as well as critics of the regime followed. 
Repressive measures increased after the outbreak of the uprising, includ-
ing executions of individuals and groups by Italian military, police and civil-
ian authorities. The deprivation of freedom and deportation to prisons and 
concentration camps ensued. The Italians brought many of those arrested to 
Rijeka and other Italian administrative centers in the Province, from where 
they sent them to camps throughout Italy because of overcrowding which 
arose as early as autumn 1941.
With the first larger actions of restrellamenta, that is, the cleansing of the 
terrain of Partisans (beginning with an attack on Tuhobić Mountain in the 
beginning of November 1941), the need for the establishment of concen-
tration camps in the immediate vicinity and on the territory of the Rijeka 
Province became pressing because of the many civilian inhabitants seized 
in these actions. The authorities established the Concentration Camp in 
Lovran (Campo di concentramento di Laurana) on 26 November 1941 (after 
discussions on the matter in the Royal Questura in Rijeka) for the “intern-
ment of suspicious families from areas which had been annexed to the Rijeka 
Province, and whose members had fled to the woods to work with the gue-
rillas.” The Italians at first placed the Camp in the Park Hotel (with around 
500 beds), which they guarded with 20 soldiers with officers, as well as 12 
Carabinieri. The first group arrived in the Camp on 5 December 1941 from 
the area of Kastav and Sušak Counties. By the beginning of May 1942 it had 
around 900 prisoners and its lodging capacity had been filled. As a result, 
the Camp expanded into the courtyard and the neighboring Hydrotherapy 
Building. At the same time, the authorities transported internees from there 
to camps in Italy. We will set forth a number of examples showing how the 
Italians obtained new inmates for the Lovran Camp.
Prefect Testa initiated, planned and organized a retaliatory attack with 
army and Carabinieri forces on the village of Jelenje on 30 May 1942 because 
30 For more concerning this Camp, see Mihael Sobolevski, “Talijanski koncentracioni logor 
u Lovranu 1941-1943,” Liburnijske teme, vol. 6 (Opatija: 1987.), pp. 115-121. The same work 
contains statistics concerning this Camp which are cited in this article.
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certain villagers had joined the Partisans. The Italians executed 20 peo-
ple “chosen by lots” and jailed 58 families whose members had joined the 
Partisans in the Lovran Camp.30 The authorities confiscated all their proper-
ty and leveled their houses to the ground.
Under Testa’s command, on 12 July 1942 the Italian Royal Army, 
Carabinieri and Fascist Black Shirts for similar reasons attacked the village 
of Podhum, which had around 1,550 inhabitants. They executed 108 men on 
the spot and burned and destroyed all of its 370 homes and 124 farm build-
ings. They transported 185 of the village’s families consisting of 889 people 
(208 men, 269 women and 412 children) to the Lovran Camp.
The Lovran Concentration Camp continued to exist through 1 March 
1943 when the Italians dissolved it. Until then, around 3,000 imprisoned 
persons passed through the Camp, mostly from the Province of Rijeka, with 
smaller numbers from Dalmatia as well as Ljubljana and area.31
Because the number of prisoners and internees became larger every day, 
the Italians determined to establish several new camps in the Province of 
Rijeka. One of the transit camps included a Camp in Rijeka; 3,500 internees 
passed through it, mostly women and children. The Italians sent the inmates 
to other camps in Italy after they had been kept in Rijeka for a period of 
time. Available information concerning the administration and work of this 
Camp remains sparse.32
Another Camp in Bakar existed from March 1942 to July 1943. The 
Italians used it as a collection point and imprisoned people there from 
the Gorski kotar and Croatian Littoral after Italian cleansing operations. 
In these operations, the Italians systematically destroyed villages and iso-
lated hamlets “which are not occupied militarily [by Italian forces - Z.D.] 
and do not have the conditions to eventually become military strongholds.” 
All the people there had to be “immediately removed and taken to specif-
ic concentration camps in other areas.”33 At the same time, the state req-
uisitioned all livestock in these settlements. The scope of these operations 
can be best seen by the report of the Italian commissar of Čabar County 
sent to Prefect Testa on 3 September 1942. It claimed that from 31 March 
to 1 September 1942 the population of the County decreased from 12,263 
to 5,545 “primarily because of the internment and dispersal undertaken by 
the military authorities.” It added that the decrease in population would 
continue.34 Statistics of the Croatian State Commission for Determining 
Crimes of the Occupiers and Their Allies confirm this. According to them, 
Italian authorities interned 4,500 people from that County. Many of them 
31 H. Mezulić, Fašizam krstitelj i palikuća, pp. 41-44. Both settlements are found in the town-
ship (općina) Jelenje in Sušak County.
32 N. Lengel-Krizman, “Koncentracioni logori talijanskog okupatora,” pp. 250-251 and 
Hrvoje Mezulić, Fašizam krstitelj i palikuća, pp. 47-52.
33 H. Mezulić, Fašizam krstitelj i palikuća, pp. 52-53. 
34 Ibid., pp. 47-52. 
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went through the Bakar Camp. 3,145 people from the area of that County 
and part of Delnice County were interned in that Camp from 30 July to 2 
August 1942. The Camp on average held around 2,000 prisoners. A portion 
of the inmates continued to be sent on in groups to other camps, especial-
ly the newly established camp on Rab. The Italians housed the internees in 
a number of filthy, vermin-infested wooden barracks. The inmates slept on 
beds with little straw and without enough blankets and received poor food. 
Italian physicians running health services in the Camp sent only the sick-
est to Rijeka’s hospital. The Italians removed the last 800 inmates on 2 July 
1943 to Rijeka, where after being kept for a while at the Diaz Barracks, they 
sent them to other camps. As a practical matter, this ended the work of the 
Bakar Camp.35
Large “cleansing” operations by Italians in the entire Ljubljana Province 
and in the frontier regions of the Rijeka Province in the middle of 1942 
led to a large number of internees who could not be placed in overcrowd-
ed camps and jails and required the opening of new camps. As a result, on 
27 July 1942 the Italians established the Rab Concentration Camp for Civil 
and Military Internees (Campo di concentramento per internati civili di qver-
ro Arbe) as the largest Italian camp on Croatian territory as measured both 
by the number of internees and the number of victims.
The Italians established the Camp on Kampor Field (as a result of which 
it also became known as the Kampor Camp) between Kampor Bay and St. 
Euphemia, around 5 to 6 kilometers from Rab town. All shrubs were initial-
In October 1941, Italian authorities removed 
and damaged the statue of Medieval Croatian 
Bishop Grgur of Nin. An artwork of the famous 
Croatian sculptor Ivan Meštrović
35 N. Lengel-Krizman, “Koncentracioni logori talijanskog okupatora,” pp. 250-251.
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ly cleared, while approximately a dozen families were moved from Kampor 
and Italian officers placed in their homes. Afterwards, the Kampor-Rab road 
was widened. The men’s portion of the Camp was located on the north-
ern side of the road and the women’s and children’s section of the Camp 
was placed on the southern end. Barbed wire surrounded the entire Camp. 
Within the wire, small tents had been placed, replaced in December 1942 
by walled buildings made from sun dried bricks and by wooden barracks 
for the internees. 2,200 Italian soldiers and Carabinieri guarded the Camp. 
They were located in Rab town and in guard houses around the Camp used 
reflectors used to illuminate the Camp at night.
Colonel Vicenzo Cuiuli served as Camp commander. The first group of 
432 Slovene men arrived in the Camp on 28 and 31 July 1942. 5,599 persons, 
of whom 3,496 Slovenes (2,302 men, 597 women and 597 children) with the 
remainder being mostly Croats from the Gorski kotar (1,663 persons), the 
Bakar Camp (296 persons) and camps in Italy (144 people), arrived in the 
camp during 2 August to 9 August alone. Among these inmates, women and 
children composed around 80% of the total number. By the end of September 
1942 the Camp had 13,000 to 15,000 internees, two-thirds of them Slovenes. 
Children made up more than 2,000 of the inmates (1,463 of them Slovenes). 
The number of internees began to gradually drop because of the high mor-
tality rate among the inmates, because some inmates had been sent to camps 
in Italy and because smaller groups of inmates had been freed. Around 3,000 
remained in the Camp in January 1943, with another 2,000 in the hotel-“hos-
pitals” in Rab town. In April 1943 the inmates totaled 2,500.
Most of the internees remained naked and shoeless and lived under very 
difficult lodging, sanitary, work, nourishment and health conditions. The lack 
of food made hunger the biggest problem. Evidence of this can be seen by 
the name given to the main square in the Camp, “Hunger Square.” All of this, 
along with winter weather, caused exhaustion and the outbreak of various ill-
nesses. Changing Rab’s hotels into improvised hospitals did not help because 
medicine had been as scarce as food. Children suffered the most and requests 
of humanitarian organizations from Croatia and Slovenia to free them came 
to naught since Italian authorities would not permit it. Because of all of this 
the mortality rate in the Camp became very high, evidenced by the 4,641 per-
sons who died there, as estimated by the Commission for the Determination 
of Crimes of the Occupiers and Their Allies. As a result, this Camp can be 
compared with Nazi concentration camps. The first to die had been buried in 
the monastery’s cemetery in Kampor. Later the Camp’s administrators opened 
a new cemetery, located a 20 minute walk southwest of the Camp and sur-
rounded by a 1½ meter wall. Documents record the names of 1,061 persons 
buried there, even though every grave held two and even three dead inmates 
while only one name appeared on each of the crosses marking them. Thirty-
four inmates are known to have died in Rijeka’s hospital.
The Italians founded the Jewish Camp on 28 May 1943 across the way 
from the Slovene and Croat Camp. A wire fence separated the two Camps 
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as did a constant camp guard in order to prevent communication between 
them. However, inmates quickly established ties between the two Camps. 
In the Jewish Camp, groups of Jews gradually arrived from the dissolved 
Jewish camps in Dubrovnik, Hvar, Brač and Kraljevica. From 19 June to 21 
July 1943 (when the last transport arrived), 2,353 people (1,064 men, 982 
women and 307 children) arrived in Rab. A total of 3,577 Jews are known 
by name to have been interned in the Rab Camp. They had much more dif-
ficult living conditions in this Camp than they had had in the prior camps, 
but better conditions than the inmates in the Slovene and Croat Camp next 
to them. Eleven Jews died prior to the liberation of the Camp.
From the very start of the existence of the Camp, organized political work 
supporting the Partisans existed in both Camps along with ties with simi-
lar organizations on Rab Island. The people of Rab saved at least one thou-
sand inmates from certain death. Upon hearing of the capitulation of Italy 
on 8 September 1943, the inmates, totaling 4,390 from both Camps charged 
and disarmed the guards, who offered no resistance, and so they liberat-
ed themselves. The next day the armed inmates organized the Rab Partisan 
Brigade with four Slovene and one Jewish battalion, totaling 1,600 sol-
diers and they proclaimed a “people’s government” in the Camp. In agree-
ment with the local National Liberation Committee of Rab, they disarmed 
remaining 2,200 Italian soldiers and Carabinieri on the island as well as the 
Italian garrison in Osor on Cres Island. Three hundred twelve Jews then 
on Rab entered the National Liberation Army (Narodna oslobodilačka vojs-
ka - NOV) of Croatia (of whom 244 joined the Jewish Rab Battalion). In 
accordance with the orders of the Supreme Command of the NOV and the 
Partisan Units of Croatia, the Rab Brigade had been transferred to the main-
land by 19 September 1943. There the Brigade had been reorganized into 
the 16th Slovenian Brigade and sent to Slovenia, while the Jewish Partisan 
Battalion remained in Croatia. A group of 211 Jewish inmates on their own 
went to Italy after the liberation of the Camp.
Because of the penetration of German forces in the general region toward 
the end of October 1943, the remaining Jews on Rab had to be quick-
ly evacuated. Because the NOV of Croatia did not have larger ships, the 
State Anti-Fascist Council for the National Liberation of Croatia (Zemaljsko 
antifašističko vijeće narodnog oslobodjenje Hrvatske - ZAVNOH), the supreme 
pro-Partisan executive and legislative authority in Croatia, requested that 
the Allies in southern Italy use their ships to carry the Jews to mainland 
areas under Partisan control or to Italy. But, because the Allies remained 
deaf to this request (and they also did not send requested food assistance), 
the Supreme Command of the NOV of Croatia, with the help of pro-
Partisan civilian authorities in the area, used small boats (known as trabaku-
lina) to bring 2,839 Jews to the mainland. 648 of them joined Partisan forc-
es and more than 350 joined various pro-Partisan organizations in Croatia. 
ZAVNOH undertook to take care of their lodging, feeding and security. This 
represented one of the largest actions to save Jews and their active inclusion 
in the anti-fascist movement during the Second World War in Europe.
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Unfortunately, around 200 former Jewish inmates voluntarily remained 
on Rab. The Germans seized them on 22 March 1944 and afterwards sent 
them to Auschwitz where the Germans liquidated practically all of them.
Almost all of the Croat inmates on Rab entered Partisan units on the 
Island or on the mainland as well as pro-Partisan organizations.36
The Effects of Italian Policies Toward Croatian Territories
During the attack on Croatian territories in April 1941, the Yugoslav 
Royal Army surrendered without any resistance (other than weak resistance 
in Dubrovnik and Knin) with a large amount of arms, weapons and military 
hardware. The Italians took all of these supplies while placing some of the 
soldiers and their commanders (mostly Serbs) born in the First, Second and 
Third Zones in prisoner of war camps in Italy where most remained until 
Italy’s capitulation. This act alone prevented these men from working (with-
out even going into the difficult living conditions in the camps) and thus 
inflicted a tremendous economic cost.37
Italian collaboration with Serbian Chetniks. Members of the Fascist Militia (MVSN - Milizia 
volontaria per la sicurezza nazionale) and the Chetniks in the vicinity of Knin in 1942 
36 For further materials concerning these matters see: Ivo Kovačić, Koncentracioni 
logor Kampor na Rabu 1942-1943. (Rijeka: “Adamić”, 1998); Narcisa Lengel-Krizman, 
“Koncentracioni logori talijanskog okupatora,” pp. 258-265, and 279-282; Rab živa priča 
“kulture in civilizacije” talijanskega okupatorja. (Maribor: 1953); M. Konjhodžić, Krvavim 
tragovima talijanskih fašista. (Zagreb: 1945); F. Potočnik, “Kako su se oslobodili internirci, 
Otpor u žicama, I (Belgrade: Vojnoizdavački zavod, 1969), and in the same book F. Šušterčić, 
“Rab;” Jaša Romano, “Jevreji u logoru na Rabu i njihovo uključivanje u NOR,” no. 2 (Belgrade: 
Jevrejski istorijski muzej, 1973.).
37 N. Živković, Ratna šteta koju je Italija učinila Jugoslavij, pp. 21-23 and 29-35.
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The Italians also received all of the ships (with a handful of exceptions) of 
the Yugoslav Royal Navy. In the garrisons, military installations, warehous-
es and depots on these territories, the Italian Army came across a significant 
cache of materiel (arms, tools, mines, munitions, transport vehicles and live-
stock) which the Italian Army seized, taking part, using part and destroying 
the rest (along with some of the buildings). As a result, looking only at the 
territory of the present Republic of Croatia, the damage committed by the 
Italian Army in approximately 13 garrisons found in the First, Second and 
Third Zones has been estimated at approximately 40 billion dinars.38
Especially significant damages resulted from the destruction and exploi-
tation of economic resources in these areas. These areas had bauxite, man-
ganese, phosphate, coal, iron and other mines (the Germans shared in part 
of the production of the bauxite mines in agreement with the Italians). The 
Italians used the ores while damaging a significant portion of the equipment 
and the mines. The same occurred with industrial plant, especially cement 
and aluminum factories, quarries and shipyards, as well as in the areas of 
agriculture, livestock, vineyards, fruit orchards, forests, transportation, ship-
ping and banking.39
Damages from the exploitation of the labor force followed, both in these 
areas and in Italy itself. The workers, war prisoners and internees used to 
perform labor probably totaled approximately 50,000. Some workers went 
to work in Italy on the basis of an agreement between Italy and the NDH. 
The Italians engaged many (a large portion of which consisted of forced 
labor) in all economic branches in the annexed and occupied Croatian terri-
tories held by the Italians, and in return gave little if any compensation.
Even greater damage resulted from the expulsion, arrest, internment and 
deportation of thousands of people, most of them innocent civilians (with-
out regard to age or gender). They spent months or years languishing in 
prisons and camps where many lost their lives. Along with this came mass 
exhaustion from hunger and mistreatment and executions throughout the 
annexed and occupied zones, along with systematic looting of moveable and 
destruction of immovable property.
According to statistics collected through 1946 by the Commission for 
War Damages on the Territory of the People’s Republic of Croatia (with-
out Istria), Italian authorities with their collaborators seized 9,783 people, 
captured 2,058 people, interned 16,870 people, confined 1,327 people and 
expelled 3,527 people. They took 955 people into forced labor and forcibly 
mobilized 615 individuals, giving a total of 33,141 persons, to which must 
be added 4,269 persons whose “dignity and honor” the Italians sullied. These 
numbers only include the victims who had survived and had until then filed 
reports.
38 Ibid., pp. 24-26.
39 Ibid., pp. 73-145. This source further includes information concerning the amount of 
monetary damages caused by the Italians for certain of these industrial branches.
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The Committee further found that the Italian occupier and their collabo-
rators on the territory of the Republic of Croatia killed 9,657 anti-fascist sol-
diers and 30,795 civilians, or a total of 40,442 persons, of whom 9,439 con-
sisted of women. But these statistics do not distinguish between those killed 
inside and those killed outside jails and camps.
At that time, the total damages committed by the Italians had been cal-
culated at 26,655,639,943 pre-war Yugoslav dinars (at the time the exchange 
rate was 228.83 dinars per 100 lira).40
Most of these victims came from Dalmatia. According to a list of the 
former United Alliance of Soldiers of the National Liberation War (Savez 
udruženja boraca narodnooslobodilačkog rata) of Croatia from 1986, 18,824 
Partisans and 10,019 civilians died (of whom 2,166 consisted of women 
and 1,400 consisted of children). According to statistics of the Provincial 
Commission for the Confirmation of Crimes of the Occupiers and Their 
Collaborators for Istria collected in 1946, 5,802 civilians in Istria had been 
documented as having lost their lives. Italian fascists killed 889 by themselves 
and 1,314 together with the Germans. More than 5,000 Partisans from Istria 
died in battle. At the same time, 14,867 Istrians had been imprisoned, 21,509 
Istrians had been taken into camps or forced labor, and 5,955 homes and 
other buildings had been torched or destroyed mostly by Italian civilian and 
military authorities. If we add this to economic losses, the total damages suf-
fered by Istria during the Second World War came to US $1,134,350,608.41
40 HDA, Zemaljska komisija za ratnu štetu Hrvatske 1945-1947, boxes 95-98; Zemaljska 
komisija za utvrđivanje zločina okupatora i njihova pomagača Hrvatske (ZKRZ) 1945-1946, 
box 30, 645-648. This source includes individual lists of victims of the War which had been 
collected by the Commission until 1946. The Commission collected statements in the terri-
tory of the People’s Republic of Croatia. At that time, it had compiled a list of 109,222 vic-
tims, of whom the Italians had killed 8,011 and 1,247 had been killed by both Germans and 
Italians. A list from 1950 claims that the number of people killed in Croatia totaled 156,158 
(109,784 civilians and 46,374 Partisans), a list from 1964 has 194,749 victims and a list from 
1988 198,759 victims, but it does not break the victims down into categories of victims or 
set forth who had been responsible for their deaths. According to unpublished portions of 
the 1964 list, 17,100 civilians died at the hands of the Italians, while the remainder had been 
killed by Italians and Germans, Chetniks and military forces of the NDH. This is why the 
analysis of all the victims from the Republic of Croatia continues. One should also add that 
for political reasons these lists did not include those members of the Ustasha movement 
killed by Italians and did not include those killed among the civilian and military authori-
ties of the NDH and their relatives. Further, the numbers discussed in this article do not 
include those Croats killed by Italians in Bosnia and Herzegovina and in Montenegro. The 
Yugoslavian International Reparation Commission in Paris in 1947 requested $9.85 billion in 
war damages from Italy.
41 HDA, ZKRZ, GUZ, no, 5.514/1946, box 124, and Nikola Živković, “Ljudske i materijalne 
žrtve Istre u Drugom svjetskom ratu,” Pazinski memorijal, vol. 12 (Pazin: Katedra Čakavskog 
sabora, 1983), pp. 287-291. The above cited work contains 39 other works from a scholarly con-
ference entitled “Istria and the Remaining Annexed Areas in 1943,” held in Pazin in comme-
moration of the 35th anniversary of the events surrounding Italy’s capitulation. It must be sta-
ted that the Germans sent all Italians who refused to join them to camps and assigned the rest 
to their military units. The Germans formed special Fascist and carabinieri units composed of
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The number of victims from Istria, the Gorski kotar and the Croatian 
Littoral, according to a 1988 list, totaled 13,695 Partisans killed and 9,314 
civilian deaths (1,856 of them women and 689 children), most of whom had 
been killed by the Italians and their collaborators. The material damages 
also had been great.
The basis for all of these statistics proved difficult to come by and they 
have been gradually revised through the years. One can see this by the fol-
lowing facts concerning the Gorski kotar and Dalmatia, the location of 
many Italian “cleansing” actions. According to the initial statistics of the 
District National Liberation Committee (NOO) for the Gorski kotar com-
piled in August 1944, the occupiers had destroyed and torched 3,131 hous-
es and 3,810 other buildings, destroyed and seized 4,697 heads of cattle, 745 
horses, 2,486 pigs, 5,071 heads of small livestock, and torched 12 church-
es and 9 sawmills. According to the initial statistics of the Provincial NOO 
for Dalmatia compiled in August 1944, the “enemy” in Dalmatia had exe-
cuted 4,948 and interned 2,144 people, destroyed 8,227 houses, 3,245 other 
buildings, 58 public buildings and 82 industrial companies and seized 1,761 
horses, 3,036 head of large and 51,575 head of small livestock, 1,569 pigs 
and 20,891 head of poultry. According to newer statistics from about twen-
those Italians from Zadar and Istria who joined them. The Germans used these forces in 
actions against the Partisans and their National Liberation Movement as they had good 
knowledge of local conditions. These units are blamed for killing many of victims which are 
included in the reports of the Commission.
Italians (Person in the left is a member of the 
Fascist Militia  - Note the Distinctive MVSN 
Cap-Badge) posing over the dead bodies of their 
victims near Vodice (Central Dalmatia), 1943.
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ty days later, the NOO confirmed that more than 8,000 had been killed, 
not including those who died or had been executed in prisons and camps 
through which 80,000 people from Dalmatia had passed (or 12% of the 
entire population), and the number of looted and destroyed houses reached 
over 20,000, along with the destruction of 89,585 grape vines, 3,775 fruit 
trees and 6,508,823 square meters of forests.42
The confirmation of the names and numbers of victims and their classi-
fication based on those who committed these crimes continues to this day. 
One of the priorities of future researchers must be the thorough examina-
tion of the crimes committed by Italian Fascists during the Second World 
War on the territory of the Republic of Croatia, their scholarly presenta-
tion and the publication of their results, with a list of all those killed. These 
problems must be examined in a scholarly manner without damaging rela-
tions between the Republics of Croatia and Italy. This needs to be done 
soon since certain circles in Italy continue to promote expansionist poli-
cies toward Croatian Istria, Rijeka and Dalmatia, claiming borders similar 
to those of the Second Zone in the NDH.43 Such policies represent a con-
tinuation of those pursued by the Italians in Croatian territories during the 
Second World War of which we have just spoken.
In order to better understand these policies it is necessary to note here the 
questions concerning the relationship between Italy and the NDH discussed 
at a 11 August 1943 meeting between Luigi Petrucci, the Italian ambassador 
and authorized minister in the NDH, and General Mario Robotti, the com-
mander of the Second Italian Army and administrator of all annexed and 
occupied Croatian territories. Their talk focused on Italian relations with 
the Chetniks, Italian repression and acts of revenge against the population 
in these territories and possible solutions at the end of the War. With respect 
to the Chetniks, the discussion centered on the need for their gradual dis-
armament so as to prevent them from fleeing to the Partisans, the need 
to stop provisioning them with arms and the need of the Italians to shift 
to voluntary recruitment for mixed battalions of Orthodox, Catholics and 
Muslims in agreement with Croatian authorities (such as had been done 
with German SS Divisions).
Concerning reprisals, they discussed that they should only be carried out 
against those houses from which Italian soldiers had been fired upon and in 
retaliation for direct and indirect cooperation between the population and 
the Partisans. They also spoke about how NDH authorities had determined 
that they would (in cooperation with the Germans and perhaps encouraged 
by them) enter Dalmatia if Italy left the War as they feared that the Italians 
would otherwise hand Dalmatia and the Littoral over to the Chetniks or the 
42 Bilten Telegrafske agencije Hrvatske, no. 2 and 3, 16 and 20 August 1944, pp. 8 and 3, 
respectively, and no. 2, 6 September 1944, p. 5.
43 Ive Mihovilović, Italijanska ekspanzionistička politika prema Istri, Rijeci i Dalmaciji (1945-
1953) (Belgrade: Institut za međunarodnu politiku i privredu, 1954), and Duško Večerina, 
Talijanski iredentizam, (Zagreb: By The Author, 2001).
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Partisans. As a result, they believed that they needed to maintain good rela-
tions with the Croats and thus avoid massive repressions because otherwise 
“all the Croats will be against us, to the extent that we do not satisfy them by 
at least giving them some concessions (I allude (Robotti) to Dalmatia).”
Petrucci thought that one of the three following solutions would occur at 
the end of the War on these territories:
the establishment of a Greater Yugoslavia as the English promised 
King Peter. From this we cannot expect anything good - it would be 
100% anti-Italian and would have in mind its expansion to Udine;
the establishment of a Greater Serbia which would take up Bosnia, 
Herzegovina and Dalmatia, possibly to Split. This situation would be 
somewhat better for us;
the establishment of a Greater Croatia which would be the least harm-
ful to us. Of course the establishment of such a new organism would 
have to be based on other foundations than that of today’s Croatia and 
it could not be achieved without us suffering significant losses.”
Of interest are the comments of the Intelligence Division of the Italian 
General Command for Ground Forces, which received a copy of a transcript 
of these discussions. Along with the claim that Petrucci “is not familiar with 
the confused problems of Serbs-Croats-Slovenes-Muslims and Chetniks,” it 
states the following:
A Greater Croatia, sympathetic or friendly toward Italy, is impos-
sible. The Croats have been historically and remain our enemies. The 
reason: the Adriatic Sea.
Our interests in this Sea are completely in conflict and we cannot 
survive with a Greater Croatia and, even worse, if we were to re-esta-
blish old Austria.
Further, Croatia has never been able to live without relying on 
someone, so that this means that to the extent it is larger and since it 
will not rely on Italy it will be that much more dangerous for us.
As a result, it would be desirable that if such a Croatia is established 
that it be small in accordance with its natural limitations.
The establishment of Serbia can be of use to us if such a Serbia is 
limited to its natural borders; a Greater Serbia would stretch to the 
Adriatic Sea, and there our interests would come into conflict, as is 
the case with a Greater Croatia.
However, the greatest threat is the formation of a Greater Yugoslavia (in 
accordance with the thoughts and plans of London). With it the Adriatic ques-
tion would be not only more dangerous, but it would give birth to the problem 
of Irredentism in relation to Dalmatia, Istria, Albania, the Guilian region, etc.”44
44 NOB u Dalmaciji, vol. 7 (July-August 1943) (Split, IHRPD, 1984.), op. cit., pp. 752-754.
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One should not doubt how many such thoughts existed and how many 
remain still present especially in certain Irredentist circles in Italy.
It needs to be emphasized in conclusion that those responsible for those 
numerous Italian crimes committed in Croatian territories during the 
Second World War, which we have in part described in this article, have 
never answered for their actions, other than a handful of individuals whom 
the Partisans had arrested or captured and condemned.45
Translated by John Peter Kraljic
Die Politik Italiens gegenüber kroatischen Gebieten und 
deren Folgen im Zweiten Weltkrieg
Zusammenfassung
Die Politik Italiens im Zweiten Weltkrieg ist eine Fortsetzung der Politik, die 
von Faschisten seit der Machtübernahme im Jahre 1922 geführt worden ist und 
deren Bestreben es war, den jugoslawischen Staat zu Fall zu bringen, Dalmatien zu 
annektieren und einen kroatischen Staat unter italienischem Protektorat zu bilden. 
Zur Verwirklichung dieser Ziele arbeitete Italien bereits vor dem Krieg auf inter-
nationaler Ebene an der diplomatischen Umkreisung Jugoslawiens (es verbünde-
te sich vornehmlich mit Bulgarien und Ungarn), und unterstützte separatistische 
Bewegungen innerhalb Jugoslawiens, allen voran die Ustaschabewegung.
Nach der Errichtung der Diktatur von König Alexander wurden Militärlager der 
Ustascha in Italien gegründet und, mit dem gleichen Bestreben, der Aufstand in 
Lika im Jahre 1932 unterstützt.
Die oben genannten Tendenzen italienischer Politik verwirklichen sich im sog. 
Aprilkrieg von 1941. Aufgrund des Römischen Vertrags mit dem Unabhängigen 
Staat Kroatien (kroatisch: Nezavisna država Hrvatska, NDH), annektierte Italien 
Teile des Berglandes Gorski Kotar und des Kroatischen Küstenlandes, als auch 
größere Gebiete Dalmatiens mit den Städten Šibenik, Trogir, Split und Boka 
Kotorska und die Mehrheit dalmatischer Inseln (d.h. I. italienische Zone), während 
der Unabängige Staat Kroatien italienisches Königtum, regiert von einem Mitglied 
des italienischen Königshauses (Herzog von Spoleta), werden sollte. Die demilita-
risierten Küstengebiete des NDH wurden zur II. italienischen Zone erklärt, und 
das Gebiet bis zur deutsch-italienischen Demarkationslinie (Samobor-Glina-
Dvor-Jajce-Fojnica-Višegrad) zur III. italienischen Zone (insgesamt rund 48.000 
km² mit 2.400.000 Bewohnern). Den Aufstand von Juli und August 1941. nutzte 
45 The British and Americans prevented such trials for political reasons, as they feared 
that the Communists would come to power in Italy in 1945. As a result, none of the over 
3,000 Italians suspected of having committed war crimes in the area of Yugoslavia (mostly in 
Croatia) during World War II were ever extradited to Yugoslav Communist authorities. See 
more concerning this in Fiamma Nirenstein, “Genocido all’italiana”, Epoca (Milan), no. 1945, 
17 January 1988.
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Italien zur Wiederbesetzung der II. und III. italienischen Zone, wobei es sich mit 
Tschetniks verbündete, die in diesen Gebieten des Unabhängigen Staates Kroatien 
die «Säuberung» der nichtserbischen Bevölkerung vollbringen sollten.
Unmittelbar nach der Besetzung dieser Gebiete haben die Italiener, nebst 
umfangreicher Säuberungsaktionen an der Zivilbevölkerung (Internation), mit 
der systematischen und äußerst rücksichtslosen wirtschaftlichen Ausbeutung 
begonnen. All das hatte menschliche Verluste zur Folge, die sich laut Angaben der 
Landeskommission für die Ermittlung von Verbrechen der Okkupanten und deren 
Helfershelfern auf 9.647 gefallene antifaschistische Kämpfer und 30.795 Zivilopfer 
(sic 9.439 Frauen), 9.783 Verhaftete, 2.058 gefangene Kämpfer, 16.870 internierte 
Personen usw. beliefen. 
